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Resilience and the End(s) of the Politics of Adaptation
Abstract
This closing article focuses on the problematic of the politics of adaptation and 
suggests that resilience appears to be increasingly exhausted as a 
governmental or analytical framing. The article is in three sections. The first 
provides an overview of the problems facing adaptation today, especially 
where ‘top-down’ or ‘engineering’ approaches to resilience are considered to 
be artificial or ‘coercive’. The second section analyses alternative approaches 
to adaptation, from the bottom-up, often relying on the engagement of local 
communities, aided by the rolling out of ubiquitous computational 
technologies, like the Internet of Things. In closing, I suggest that resilience as 
a policy framework of adaptation appears to be drawing to a close as it lacks 
an adequate agential or transformative aspect: it is always too oriented to 
adapting to feedbacks and modulating around sustaining what exists.
Keywords: resilience, adaptation, politics, global warming, Anthropocene
Introduction
This collection in the final issue of the Resilience journal has nicely drawn out 
some of the varieties of perspectives on the politics of resilience. Thinking the 
politics of resilience often depends very much, as the editors argue, on the 
specific area of focus as much as the normative predilections of the author. 
Perhaps, one thing that comes through clearly is that while definitions of 
resilience have their limitations, the development of resilience and its rapid 
spread throughout the policy world over the last two decades, importantly 
highlights a desire to use systems theories and process understandings to 
develop a range of adaptive approaches. Thinking through policy-making and 
analysis on the basis of system-interactions and adaptation rather than 
instrumentality and linear causality implies a certain ‘politics’ but one that 
seems to be increasingly problematic when we consider the extent of the 
policy challenges posed by catastrophic global warming in our contemporary 
age, increasingly understood as that of the Anthropocene. 
This conclusion focuses on the problematic of the politics of adaptation and 
suggests that resilience appears to be increasingly exhausted as a 
governmental or analytical framing. It firstly provides an overview of the 
problems facing adaptation today, especially where ‘top-down’ or 
‘engineering’ approaches to resilience are considered to be artificial or 
‘coercive’. Then there follows a consideration of alternative approaches to 
adaptation, from the bottom-up, often relying on the engagement of local 
communities aided by the rolling out of ubiquitous computational technologies, 
like the Internet of Things. I end with the provocation that resilience as a 
policy framework of adaptation appears to be drawing to a close as it lacks an 
adequate agential or transformative aspect: it is always too oriented to 
adapting to feedbacks and modulating around sustaining what exists. When 
what exists is the problem itself, in terms of anthropogenic global warming 
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and climate change, then it is clear that critical thought and policy practice 
need to go beyond imaginaries of resilience.
Rethinking the Politics of Adaptation
Resilience approaches discursively frame policy problems, and their 
resolution, through the focus on enabling and capacity-building communities 
and systems - held to be ‘vulnerable’, ‘at risk’ or ‘failing’ - through an 
imaginary that somehow natural, innate or inherent resources and productive 
capacities can be enhanced and developed. These potential imaginaries of 
resilience - as a policy-making ‘magic bullet’ for problems as diverse as 
underdevelopment, conflict and environmental crises – have come under 
challenge today. The argument of this conclusion is that approaches attuned 
to the centrality of the Anthropocene provide a critique of the politics of 
adaptation which is much more powerful than that levelled by critical societal 
and political theorists who have, over the last decade, condemned resilience 
discourses for their imbrications within neoliberal paradigms (Walker and 
Cooper, 2011; Evans and Reid, 2014; Chandler, 2014; Joseph, 2013). In fact, 
the problematic of global warming and climate change appears to directly 
challenge the assumptions about resilience, neoliberalism and complexity 
developed by Jeremy Walker and Melinda Cooper (2011) in their article that 
initiated the mainstreaming of critical thinking in this area. Walker and Cooper 
argued that resilience-thinking was immune to critique, ‘reabsorbing’ or 
‘metabolizing critique into its internal dynamic’ as ‘the complex adaptive 
system remains self-referential even when it encounters the most violent of 
shocks’ (2011, p. 157). As long as policy-makers and academic theorists 
presumed a modernist ‘one world world’ external to us and amenable to 
governing and policy interventions, resilience thinking could ‘reabsorb’ or 
‘metabolize’ shocks and ‘bounce-back’ through learning from disasters – even 
reimagining catastrophes as ‘emancipatory’ (Beck, 2015) – or as facilitating 
new forms of self-growth and improved systems of self-management, 
‘bouncing-forward’ with what the President of the Rockefeller Foundation, 
Judith Rodin, describes as the ‘resilience dividend’ (Rodin, 2015). 
The problem is, as Anthropocene thinkers argue, that it is increasingly 
realised that climate change is not just another problem or crisis to be ‘solved’ 
or ‘bounced-back’ from’ or ‘recouped’ but rather a sign that modernity itself 
held out a false promise of salvation, one that has brought us to the brink of 
destruction (Latour, 2013; Stengers, 2015; Tsing, 2015). While resilience-
thinking has recently achieved nearly universal success in the policy-making 
world - suggesting new sensitivities to problems and rejecting ‘high-modernist’ 
technocratic approaches, which depended upon universal ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
solutions from on high - resilience is still a ‘modern’ construction which 
assumes that problems are ‘external’ and that we need to develop ‘internal’ 
policy solutions to maintain and to enable our existing modes of being in the 
face of shocks and perturbations. ‘We’ need to be more responsive and 
adaptable. ‘We’ need to be sensitive to minor changes and to ‘tipping points’. 
In short, that ‘we’ are not the problem, but that ‘we’ need to develop new 
approaches to preserve our modernist imaginaries of development and 
progress. 
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While resilience-thinking could ‘reabsorb’ or ‘metabolize’ critiques framed 
through modernist assumptions of overcoming and problem-solving, it is 
unable to ‘adapt’ to the new and increasingly prevalent subjectivities, 
sensitivities and imaginaries generated by catastrophic climate change. The 
problems, which the Anthropocene posits for resilience advocacy, have been 
little recognised in contemporary academic discussions in the humanities and 
social sciences. Resilience can appear to be still alive and well - if not actually 
thriving - in policy debates centred upon global warming and climate change. 
In fact, for the Stockholm Resilience Alliance – in the view of many 
commentators, the leading research and advisory body for resilience-thinking 
– the conceptualisations of resilience and of the Anthropocene are closely 
interconnected. Particularly in the language of systems ecology, both 
concepts appear to share understandings of complex adaptive systems, 
‘tipping points’ and ‘phase transitions’ and to be sensitive to the limits of ‘top-
down’ or ‘linear’ approaches to problem-solving. A glance at the Resilience 
Alliance webpages1 reveals the clear interconnections between leading 
natural and social scientists, whose shared work in systems theory and 
adaptive systems has shaped thinking in both these areas: including Will 
Steffen, Paul Crutzen, Frank Biermann, Carl Folke, Johan Rockström and Jan 
Zalasiewicz among others (see also Biermann et al, 2012; Steffen et al, 
2011).
Yet, even at the ‘heart of the beast’ all is not well. One example of the limits of 
resilience-thinking comes from a group of Swedish ecology scientists linked 
with the Resilience Alliance (Stockholm Resilience Centre, 2014) and 
published in Ecosphere, the journal of the Ecological Society of America (Rist 
et al, 2014). These scientists argue that resilience-thinking has been slow to 
think through the implications of climate change and the hidden costs of 
‘anthropogenic impacts on the environment’. The problem of ignoring these 
hidden costs is highlighted in their conceptualisation of ‘coerced resilience’, 
which they define as:
Resilience that is created as a result of anthropogenic inputs such as 
labour, energy and technology, rather than supplied by the ecological 
system itself. In the context of production systems, coercion of 
resilience enables the maintenance of high levels of production. (Rist et 
al, 2014, p. 3)
Rist et al define ‘anthropogenic inputs’ as the external ‘replacement of specific 
ecosystem processes by inputs of labor and manufactured capital (e.g., fossil 
fuel, technology, nutrients, pesticides and antibiotics)’ (2014, p. 73). Thus 
sustaining or maintaining growth depends upon the taking of resources, 
technologies and materials from elsewhere, merely intensifying and 
redistributing or spreading the problems. This is firstly, because the process is 
held to weaken and undermine ‘natural processes’ of resilience and, 
secondly, because importing resources weakens other, external, ecosystems.
1 https://www.resalliance.org 
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Anthropogenic inputs make the problem worse by weakening rather than 
strengthening natural ecosystem sources of resilience. For Rist et al, this can 
be clearly seen in the shift to anthropogenic dependencies: with the 
development of intensive agriculture techniques over a thousand years ago; in 
forestry, which has moved to the industrial scale over the last few hundred 
years; and in fisheries, which became industrial after the Second World War 
(2014, p. 4). In modernity, the problem was understood to be the ability to 
sustain these vulnerable systems, particularly with concerns of falling 
productivity. But in Anthropocene-thinking resilience itself becomes the enemy 
of resilience as the addition of anthropogenic inputs begins to shift the system 
regime state, moving further and further away from reliance on the natural 
ecological processes - and, in fact, causing permanent damage to them - until 
a new regime state is reached without the possibility of any return to ‘nature’ 
(Rist et al, 2014, p. 5). Thus vulnerabilities are cascaded through the larger 
system.
Rist et al argue that one of the key problems with coerced resilience is that it 
‘masks’ or hides the real costs of production through the import of external 
capital, namely in the form of technology and fossil fuel based energy (2014, 
p. 3). Thus the problem of modernist resilience policy interventions to enable 
sustainable development and human progress is thereby their ‘artifice’ or 
falsity (see also Schmidt, 2013). For some authors, this is akin to rearranging 
the deckchairs on a sinking ship as this merely takes materials from other 
ecosystems and contributes to spreading the problem rather than resolving it. 
In fact, coercive resilience is a kind of globalisation in reverse, where the 
ability to import goods from around the globe no longer adds to productivity 
but rather spreads the sickness of undermining natural processes by over 
extraction in unsustainable ways. Thus increasing resilience through 
‘coercion’ merely enables tipping points to be reached sooner. The addition of 
anthropogenic inputs ‘masks’ the growing loss of natural ecological system 
resilience, maintaining systems in ‘artificial’ states, entirely dependent upon 
more and more external inputs:
This raises an apparent paradox, whereby highly modified production 
systems can, through anthropogenic efforts rather than ecological 
processes, mimic the response of resilient natural systems to a specified 
disturbance, in their capacity to return to pre-disturbance system states. 
(Rist et al, 2014, p. 6)
This is a dangerous situation as artificial or ‘coerced’ resilience hides the 
capacities of these systems to draw upon natural ecological processes 
(highlighted in discussions of recent declines of wild and domestic pollinators 
and the plants and other species which rely upon them) (Rist et al, 2014, p. 
6). A striking example of the limits of forced or coerced resilience is provided 
by Michael Taussig in his recent work Palma Africana, on the mass 
production of palm oil in Colombia (2018). One of the unintended and ironic 
consequences of increasing reliance on anthropogenic inputs, for example, 
the development of mono-crops, such as the ‘Hope of America’ palm, is that 
although artificially designed to prevent the spread of insect predation it needs 
additional anthropogenic interventions to artificially inseminate it. Thus 
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production becomes increasingly artificial, requiring more and more inputs, 
despite being sold as a wonderful technical solution for raising productivity:
I see these women inseminators hard at it in the lustrous photographs 
provided by the Colombian Palm Growers Association. One woman is 
kneeling by an adult palm with a plastic tube in her mouth blowing 
sperm into the tiny flowers. In another photo a dark-skinned young 
woman wearing bright pink jeans and a coal black jacket and cap guides 
the inseminating tool in her right hand while with her left she pushes back 
the palm branches studded with fierce thorns. With a look of equally fierce 
concentration she guides her instrument into its target all because 
“Hope of America” can’t get it up. One would hope for more from “Hope of 
America”. (Taussig, 2018, p. 74)
In language, which very much follows the lines of Rist et al, Taussig writes 
that:
Once triggered, assemblages tend to proliferate and somersault, one 
leading to the next… Another assemblage concerns the larger 
framework of relevant political cliché and self-awareness as to such – 
namely, third world women of color ministering to the sexual requirements of 
an impotent masculine “Hope of America” designed to stall the plagues 
brought by the very act of mono-cropping. We could continue. Thus does 
the assemblage principle provoke movement, speed, and metamorphosis. 
This is the way of things as much as a way of thinking with things. (Taussig, 
2018, p. 75)
Thus resilience, in traditional policy approaches, rather than halting or slowing 
down the process of environmental destruction and exhaustion, can in fact be 
seen as the very vector of its becoming. What is then to stop resilience from 
being retrospectively read into precisely the history of modernist 
developmentalism that it set out to produce an alternative to?
In the Anthropocene, it appears that any attempts to start from resilience 
‘problem-solving’ assumptions merely make the initial problem worse. This 
transformation or ‘transvaluation’ of solutions, which were previously seen as 
part and parcel of ‘sustainable development’ and ‘progress’, is due to the 
closing off of the development of anthropogenic forms of ‘cheating’ nature. 
Thus resilience reaches its closure at a global scale, making coercive 
resilience not just the last gasp of modernity but actually the driver for its 
demise: ‘because continued inputs are largely dependent upon, and ultimately 
limited by globally finite resources, such as fossil-fuel energy and 
phosphorous’ (Rist et al, 2014, p. 7). The Anthropocene thereby spells the 
death knell for ‘coerced’ resilience precisely through revealing the problem of 
‘masking’ the environmental implications, which the distances of time and 
space had previously concealed. High levels of production and the speed of 
‘bounce-back’ through resilience approaches were not enabling adaptation to 
new conditions but quite the opposite: merely working to ‘mask or camouflage 
the ecological signals of resilience losses and thus the true underlying 
constraints to production’ (2014, p. 8).
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Resilience, understood in modernist ways, is thereby part of the problem not 
part of the solution. You don’t have to be a scientist of system ecology (the 
original home of resilience-thinking) to realise that the whole discourse of 
resilience is potentially put at risk. Criticisms of resilience for its artifice and 
lack of attention to the ‘true underlying constraints’ of modernity are now 
‘cascading’ across the academic disciplines. Resilience-thinking rather than 
being constructed as a challenge to modernist aspirations of ‘command-and-
control’ is more likely to be seen as the last redoubt of eco-modernisers and 
of modernist dreams of technological and technocratic approaches which 
attempt to short-cut problems rather than to tackle them at source (for 
example, Schmidt, 2013; Tierney, 2015; Yarina, 2018). 
But what would non-coerced or non-anthropogenic approaches to resilience 
look like? The scientists linked to the Resilience Alliance do not make a very 
convincing case of what it would mean to ‘attempt to use natural processes to 
enhance system resilience’ and argue themselves that often ‘techno-fixes’ 
may be required in the short-term as part of the process of using and 
manipulating ‘natural processes’ (Rist et al, 2014, p. 8):
In such cases where coerced resilience is desired, the impacts on 
supporting and recipient system resilience must be considered. We argue 
that the ultimate goal is to retain or enhance the provision of global 
production system resilience through bolstering natural supporting 
processes rather than an increased reliance on anthropogenic inputs. (Rist 
et al, 2014, p. 9; emphasis added)
The game is rather given away here. The problems vitiating this approach are 
clear in the quote above. Firstly, there is a clearly instrumental approach to 
‘natural processes’, which are to be harnessed to support the existing status 
quo, thus ‘the ultimate goal’ is to support ‘global production system resilience’. 
This has come to the fore particularly in experiments in ‘rewilding’ and new 
forms of environmental conservation, seeking to enhance and expand 
‘ecosystem services’, geo- and bio-engineering nature to be more efficient 
(see, for example, Lorimer, 2015). As Anna Tsing notes, these resilience 
imaginaries are all part of an ‘ecomodernist’ fantasy of the ‘good 
Anthropocene’ (2017, p. 16). Even if this could be achieved, ‘natural 
processes’ would be further modified by anthropogenic manipulation: the 
mere need to intervene to ‘bolster’ these allegedly ‘natural processes’ would 
inevitably produce other unintended stresses and strains according to the 
logic of the authors’ own arguments. 
‘Bottom-up’ Technological Resilience
One alternative to ‘top-down’ approaches to resilience focuses upon how new 
technological advances in algorithmic computation and distributive sensory 
capacities can enable local communities to be more self-sustaining. The use 
of technology, not as a  ‘techno-fix’ that artificially hides feedback effects but 
rather as one that enables them to be seen and responded to, is now central 
to many internationally financed resilience imaginaries in the battle against the 
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effects of climate change. The rolling out of Big Data and the Internet of 
Things approaches to local communities promises a level of responsiveness 
and sensitivity to environmental changes that was previously unimaginable. 
For its boosters, in the international development agencies and corporations, 
these approaches will transform small-scale agricultural production. Even 
palm oil production receives a critical makeover. Rather than environmentally 
destructive industrial mono-cropping, small plot alternatives can be made 
economically viable if farmers sign up to digitally enhanced ‘cloud-based’ 
management systems, where farmers enable large scale data collection and 
sensory monitoring systems to be installed and so can monitor and minimise 
the use of chemicals and other anthropogenic resources as well as rapidly 
respond to drought, pests and disease - detecting problems even down to the 
level of specific trees and plots. Just as with Google and Amazon, sensitivities 
to feedbacks increases the more data is shared and drawn upon. As the 
founder of one agri-tech start-up states:
“We specifically use… cloud storage (to store raw and processed 
imagery), cloud compute (to process huge amounts of data and extract 
insights), database storage and to serve our applications… to help 
farmers grow healthier crops is a perfect example of the way in which 
technology transforms traditional industries, leading to better livelihood 
conditions. Africa can be a harsh environment for farming. Crops are 
constantly under threat from problems such as disease, pests, and 
drought. Using the… cloud, we are bringing computation, data analytics, 
and other advanced technologies to help farmers grow healthier crops, 
despite the harsh conditions.” (Cline, 2018)
The promise is that, with high levels of data generation and developments in 
computational analysis, the world (coded through datafication) can begin to 
speak for itself, moving beyond the limits of fallible instrumental reason 
(McKenna, 2016; Steadman, 2013; Anderson, 2008). According to the 
Rockefeller Foundation research group: ‘Large data collection and analysis 
may support communities by providing them with timely feedback loops on 
their immediate environment.’ (Crawford et al, 2013, p. 1) The aspiration of 
many community-based approaches is that multiple data sources can now 
enable individuals, households and societies to practice responsive and 
reflexive self-management in ways which were considered impossible before 
(for example, Marres, 2012; Halpern, 2014, pp. 242-3). In fields such as 
disaster risk reduction and disaster management the shift is already clear (de 
Coning, 2016; Ramalingam, 2013). These community-based or ‘bottom-up’ 
approaches are alleged to help empower precisely those that are most 
marginal and vulnerable at the moments of highest risk. Open information 
flows are thus held to contribute to the building of resilience by making 
communities aware of the risks and hazards they may encounter so that they 
can mobilize to protect themselves (Ahrens and Rudolph, 2006, p. 217). This 
process is captured well by Patrick Meier (2013):
Thanks to [Information and Communication Technologies] ICTs, social 
media and Big Data… we can better measure our own resilience. Think 
of it as the Quantified Self movement applied to an entirely different 
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scale, that of societies and cities. The point is that Big Data can provide 
us with more real-time feedback loops than ever before. And as 
scholars of complex systems know, feedback loops are critical for 
adaptation and change.
On this basis, international agencies, such as the World Bank, argue that it is 
possible for technological aids to enable us to be more attentive to feedback 
effects and for resilience to have more of a positive impact for the UN’s 
Sustainable Development Goals (World Bank, 2018; Chandler, 2016). One 
thing is clear, however, in this increasingly dominant perspective for dealing 
with risk, the world becomes much less amenable to transformative practices 
and experimentation. This limitation of possible alternatives is highlighted in 
Giorgio Agamben’s (2014) critique of the cybernetic ‘governance of effects’. 
He argues that whilst the governing of causes is the essence of politics, the 
governance of effects reverses the political process:
We should not neglect the philosophical implications of this reversal. It 
means an epoch-making transformation in the very idea of 
government, which overturns the traditional hierarchical relation between 
causes and effects. Since governing the causes is difficult and expensive, it 
is more safe and useful to try to govern the effects. (Agamben, 2014)
The more responses are automatic, the more the detection of signs and 
signals are all that is required; no knowledge is necessary any more than a 
thermostat needs to know why temperature changes occur. The correlation 
between the sign or signal and the emergent problem is all that is necessary. 
The learning and adjustment of these correlations is the ‘bouncing forward’ 
aspect of society understood as a complex adaptive system; progress thus 
becomes reinterpreted as a process of managing stability better in the wake 
of additional potential risks and threats (for example, Rodin, 2015). Here, 
information is adaptive or cybernetic: it is free of universal content or meaning. 
Maurizio Lazzarato has usefully highlighted that governance through signs 
displaces modernist views of subjectivity founded on universal linguistic, 
communicational and cognitive models: he understands this as ‘non-cognitive’ 
capitalism:
Instead of a rational subject who controls information and his choices, 
homo economicus is a mere terminal of asignifying, symbolic, and signifying 
semiotics and of non-linguistic constituents which for the most part 
escape his awareness. We are not only well beyond the individualism 
and rationality of homo economicus, we have moved beyond “cognitive 
capitalism”. (Lazzarato, 2014, pp. 99-100)
The problem for ‘bottom-up’ forms of resilience is that the promise of 
ubiquitous technology makes humans dependent on machines and the 
companies that manufacture and distribute these technologies. More 
importantly, the cybernetic impulse behind ‘bottom-up’ approaches, as 
prevalent in disaster risk management as in IBM’s ‘smart city’ infrastructure 
experiments (Townsend, 2013, pp. 65-9), is problematic in that ‘non-cognitive’ 
forms of responsivity to changes seek merely to modulate around the 
9
imaginary of a stable equilibrium. Machinic models of adaptation, even at high 
speeds or imagined as ‘real time’ forms of responsivity, make sense in the 
modernist world of stability where problems are the exception to the norm. If 
this is no longer the case and problems and threats are generated by the very 
processes that are being stabilised then the politics of adaptation can no 
longer be sustainable. Resilience would appear to be exhausted as a mode of 
political thinking if, in seeking to maintain the world in its unsustainable state, 
it can perversely only speed up the process of catastrophic collapse. 
Conclusion
Resilience, as the politics of adaptation, has been heavily problematized in 
today’s context of global warming and climate change. While modernist and 
cybernetic approaches to resilience pay attention to systemic interaction, 
feedback effects and to tipping points they are inevitably productionist, 
consumptionist and extractivist. They are always focused upon saving or on 
prolonging or making more efficient what already exists. In the Anthropocene, 
these approaches stand accused of refusing to see that these contemporary 
forms of governing life are exactly the problem themselves. It is certainly true 
that resilience discourses of adaptation are losing purchase because they are 
too interested in conservation and sustainability rather than transformation, 
however whether more agential or futural alternatives can emerge or can hold 
out any opportunities for a different politics is an open one. 
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